I’ve personally reviewed and/or audited somewhere close to fifty business continuity/disaster recovery (BCP/DR) plans over the past decade.  I’ve also written or edited several of those as well in the past five years since moving into professional services for financial institutions.   Furthermore I’ve participated in roughly a half-dozen tests while still working within the infrastructure during the first part of my career.  Suffice to say I have at least an informed opinion regarding the viability of any such BCP/DR strategies.

Fundamentally there are a few varieties of  BCP/DR plans:  Those that are current and viable, those that convince your examiner that it’s current and viable and those that may have been viable years ago but bear no resemblance to your current business profile.  And beyond those there’s the worst of BCP/DR realities, the non-existent one.  But really in the end what your current state of preparedness comes down to is this – either you’re ready for an event or you’re not.   And in the past forty-eight hours that’s been made abundantly clear in the form of how many of my clients affected by Hurricane Sandy have navigated through what’s now clearly one of the worst weather events in my lifetime.

Around noontime yesterday (October 29, 2012) as weather conditions worsened and major metropolitan areas were literally shutting down for business I started checking up on a few clients.  The first thing I did was visit the website of every client that my practice has assisted with their BCP/DR strategy – each of them had updated their website to announce that branches in the affected areas were closed.  Some had a pop-up window with the update, others had a message displayed in either bright red letters, bold font or both.  As a standard design consideration each of them also had phone numbers clearly displayed and when I called a sampling real people answered and were available to assist me.  I inquired of a few of them where they were physically located and they were all located remotely and not on site in affected areas (much to their credit they were reluctant to share too much information).   The second thing I did was visit the website for a few clients whose BCP/DR plans were tagged during an audit/assessment as either being deficient or missing.  The websites were not updated and in all but one case I only learned that they were closed for the day after calling into a branch (one had an 800 number that was redirected to a real person).

Now I know this wasn’t a very deep or meaningful test of anyone’s ability to continue operations in the event of a disaster.   But what it did prove is that those institutions who had plans that were current and whose management team knew to rely upon had already thought through the little things that make a difference.   Someone knew to update the website, management knew to reroute calls away from unmanned branch locations.  I can only assume that the appropriate parties desginated to do so also contacted their regulators to inform them of their closing and that a phone chain was initiated informing staff thus keeping them off the roads and safe.  And because an important part of the plan creation/update process is both training and testing stakeholders are able to navigate through the decision tree and take appropriate related steps without having to think through it – one of the biggest challenges confronting management during a crisis.  The very best part of having a viable and current plan is that all the thinking has been done in advance and has been reviewed and validated which greatly reduces the chances that something (or someone) will be missed.

Here’s a sanity test:  If you didn’t know exactly where to begin the decision-making process or who to engage you’re in need of a new plan.  And if you did know but can’t be absolutely certain that others would be able to do the same in your absence, you’re in need of a new plan.  One of the rebuttals I’ve heard all too often when identifying a deficient or missing BCP is that management knows what to do should some manner of disaster strike.  That may be true but what happens if key people are unavailable or can’t be reached?

Seriously, when something like Hurricane Sandy occurs it’s the best time to consider how you’re institution would fare when navigating such an event.  Block off an hour within the next week with your key people, pull out your BCP/DR documentation and try and step through how you’d handle things under similar circumstances.  In a very short time you’ll gain a sense of whether or not you’re prepared and if necessary afford you the opportunity to improve.

Trust me on this – you don’t want to be in the middle of a disaster scenario and find out that your plan doesn’t work.

Earlier in the week, I came across a comment in an IT audit report in which the auditor recommended that the institution for which the report was written plan to conduct a test of their pandemic policy.  Before I continue, I need to come clean and admit that all auditors, myself included, are typically allowed a wide swath when writing our reports because while we stick to a somewhat standard approach to testing, our experiences and opinions heavily influence our findings and recommendations.  However, I found this comment to be way too granular and oddly specific.  First of all it would be the company’s pandemic procedure that would be tested, not its policy.  While this may seem trivial I can show you the scars I’ve received at the hands of auditees when confusing such terms.  Policy is how management specifies what needs to be done and procedure is how the organization gets things done; an audit confirms there are procedures in place to support the policy, that those procedures are sufficient to address the underlying risks, and that they’re being followed. My second issue with the recommendation is that the part of the overall business continuity plan (BCP) that addresses a possible pandemic scenario is only a subset.  You might recommend that a test of the overall plan be conducted but it’s a bit unusual to specify which parts should be included.

You may recall all the hysteria just about a year ago courtesy of the H1N1 (swine) flu epidemic that had everyone on edge for most of the late spring and early summer.  In the end, the numbers didn’t really reveal a remarkable increase in the number of flu cases reported year-over-year, only a shocking increase in the amount of media coverage it received.  But one of the residual effects was an increased awareness in how a financial institution would manage through a quarantine situation.  While there is real value to be derived from the planning for such an event, the bottom line is that most banks and credit unions are far more likely to confront evacuations and shut-downs due to fire, extreme weather or loss of services (e.g. electricity, heat/cooling, etc.).  When you consider that it’s challenging enough for small and midsize institutions to conduct any form of testing, you’d want them to focus on their greatest and most likely risks.  A quarantine situation, should one ever actually occur, would likely develop over a period of days and allow for a controlled transition from normal to reduced operations.  I’m just not sure that beyond covering the pandemic response plan as part of the annual training curriculum that there’s much value in conducting either a table-top or off-hours test.  It just doesn’t seem like good use of an already constrained staff.  For so many of my clients, there’s so little time to get everything done that they can ill afford to focus on the wrong things.  Perhaps a better recommendation would have been that the institution vary the parts of the plan they test each year, beginning with the pandemic section first.

At some point during the past year, it occurred to me that the difference between panic and pandemic was but a few extra letters.  It reminded me of a bit that Kevin Nealon did on Saturday Night Live years ago with subliminal messages and I’ve thought since then that might explain all the hoopla.  Because if you move past the Hollywood hype that usually fuels our fear and and think about it in practical terms, it’s just not that scary.  We have ATMs for cash and deposits, and online banking for statements, bill pay and account transfers (I can’t recall one single bank or credit union that doesn’t offer these services).  We have remote, encrypted connectivity from home for critical staff (not all of my clients make it available but the vast majority do) and most branches have drive-throughs, which further reduce the risk of exposure to airborne disease.

As I advised one BCP client recently, the annual pandemic test should consist primarily of making sure that the surgical masks and anti-bacterial soap are readily available.

And so it goes with this week’s post. Here are some nuggets that I’ve gathered over time:

Policy and procedure: I was talking to a client today about password reset lengths. Turns out for one of their products they changed the password frequency to expire after 1,000 days. Their logic was that it was low risk because the application didn’t store NPPI and the security was really only necessary to ensure proper segregation of duties. So I asked them if they had a password policy (they did) and if so were they in compliance with the policy (they weren’t). After a momentary silence, their quiet reply was “good point.” Being the auditor that I am I couldn’t help point out that the worst thing any institution could do was to deviate from a documented policy or procedure, regardless of the reason. Once an examiner discovers something like that, they figure it’s an indication of related issues and wind up digging a bit deeper. Document what it is you do and than make sure you’re doing it; while it may seem simple enough, you’d be surprised how many companies fail on that point.

Pandemic planning: There’s still heightened concern regarding the swine flu and my industry continues to beat the drum about needing to have a pandemic response plan in place. While it’s a valid point, I’ve been polling my clients over the past few months regarding their first hand experiences with the flu epidemic. Only a few have been confronted with any legitimate outbreaks and none of them have experienced an absentee rate that required unusual planning or intervention. While I’m not advocating that a pandemic response plan is superfluous, I am questioning my peers who are pushing this as a top of the list agenda item. For my money I’d rather spend time making sure that a properly vetted and tested business continuity plan is in place and spend less time and effort getting caught up in the hype.

SOX: Banks that are required to be SOX compliant need to take some time to make sure that they’re thinking things through. GLBA is a fairly rigorous and encompassing regulation and extends deeply into a financial institution’s infrastructure. To a certain extent, it serves to drive a bank’s general controls framework, be it informal or otherwise, and as a byproduct goes a long way towards establishing controls typically associated with SOX. So when I encounter clients who are tackling SOX as if though it’s its own separate set of requirements I throw up the caution flag and try and force a reset. While it may be true that larger institutions need to extend significantly from GLBA to controls around financial reporting within the infrastructure, that would only represent a subset. Before doing anything different, the bank should bring in someone who has experience working with both SOX and GLBA to identify the (many) commonalities and produce a consolidated framework so that efficiencies are both identified and realized.

Year-end activities: In my last post I discussed how there’s an uptick in services work this time of year when many banks and credit unions remember that they still need to conduct a wide range of audits and assessments in support of GLBA/NCUA regulations. If you spend some time reading through FFIEC guidance (seriously, it’s not nearly as dry and boring as you might think) there are multiple references to “your most recent audit or assessment.” For those of you who think that the need to conduct this work is suggested rather than required, consider how it looks to your examiner(s) when they discover that your most recent risk assessment was either conducted several years ago or not at all. Do you really think it reflects well on your institution that you haven’t taken a serious look at the myriad risk factors swirling about your infrastructure for any considerable length of time? In a day and age when new threats emerge almost daily if not hourly how can you justify neglecting such a critical task? The examiners expect a current set of reports not only because it’s required but also because it’s a clear indication of solid management and oversight activities.

And on a final note, I’d like to share this link to the FDIC website. You’ll find a video message from Chairman Bair on the current state of both the FDIC and the banking industry. It’s really more of a “happy recap” (with all due respect to Mets fans) of similar messages she’s released over the last year. But I think it’s worth your time (about four minutes total) to hear it for yourself and gain a sense of calm about the security of your own deposits. And for those of you who might think I’m keeping to some sort of schedule regarding Sheila Bair references, as long as she keeps doing the right things I’m going to keep bringing her name up.

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