Servers archives - Network technologies and trends

Network technologies and trends:

Servers

Jul 21 2009   7:58AM GMT

Support after sales Matters (Cisco Press Support is great)



Posted by: Yasir Irfan
Cisco Press, 640-802 CCNA Exam, CCNA, CCENT 640-822 Network Simulator, CCNA 640-802 Network Simulator; Pearson, Technical Support, Support, Cisco Press Support, Cisco Systems, Servers

 

 Whenever we buy anything either it might be a small thing or huge buch of servers, we always think of support. Yes support matters a lot, especially after buying any piece of software, study guide or a simulator. When Cisco Press released the CCENT 640-822 Network Simulator, I purchased the Simulator to test and see what Cisco Press is offering in this simulator, which was amazing and in fact I wrote a review as well in my ITKE blog.

 

Recently Cisco Press released the CCNA 640-802 Network Simulator, when I purchased the CCENT 640-822 Network Simulator there was an offer , so I was entitled for a free upgrade of the CCNA 640-802 Network Simulator. When Cisco Press released the CCNA 640-802 Network Simulator I was thinking of upgrade but the CCENT 640-822 Network Simulator was corrupted in my laptop and I was not able to activate the product. Immediately I contacted the Cisco Press Support and my problem was solved in matter of hours, which was really amazing.

 

My past experience with other vendors was not as great as of Cisco Press Support. Which proved to be vital for the Certification aspirers, as time matters? Without proper support we can suffer a lot.

Sep 16 2008   7:55AM GMT

How to enable browsing with multiple subnets(VLANS) through Microsoft ISA Server 2006



Posted by: Yasir Irfan
Networking, Servers, Subnets, ISA Server, Microsoft, Microsoft ISA, Internet Browsing

Other day we installed Microsoft ISA Server 2006 for Internet Browsing as shown in the below figure.

ISA

The ISA Server has two NICS one is connected to the DMZ zone with a Real IP Natted to a Private DMZ Zone IP and the Second NIC is connected to the internal network.

Users were able to access the internet from the same subnet of the Windows ISA Server 2006  (10.0.0.0/23 with Default Gateway 10.0.0.1). But we were facing a problem with the users in other subnet they couldn’t able to browse the Internet. So we checked the connectivity from the client to Windows ISA Server 2006  network and VLAN configurations in the Cisco Catalyst Switch. Everything was fine. But we couldn’t able to ping the default gateways for all the VLANS (subnets). Finally we checked the event log in Windows ISA Server 2006 and found that the Windows ISA Server 2006 is dropping the packets due to a suspected spoof attack. Why should requests coming from a different subnet be considered as spoof? This is because Windows ISA Server 2006 believes that requests coming from any network which does not have a direct route mentioned in its routing table are spoof. So what is the solution? Quite Simple! Add a static route using the route add command.

Route Add


Jul 13 2008   6:03AM GMT

Sample I.T. Security Policy - Internet Security



Posted by: Yasir Irfan
Networking, Security, Servers, Microsoft Windows, Linux, Switches, Cisco, Routers, Policies, Mobile, Internet Security, Network Documentation, Exchange, Network Documentation Policy, Network Policies

Finally we are completing this series; here we go with the last topic. It’s Internet Security Policy which is very important to have for any organization. I would welcome your comments which may encourage me to come up with more interesting stuff.

 

 

INTERNET POLICY

 

“IS” CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING:

1. Dedicate a firewall device. Don’t run other services on it, and disable all unnecessary service features that may be included in the firewall package.

2. Disallow all connection attempts to hosts inside the network. Allowing any inbound connections provides a mechanism hackers might be able to exploit to establish connections to Trojan horses or by exploiting bugs in service software.

3. Divide provided services using Internet tools into public services and private (organizational) services. Place the public services on an Internet site (or sites) external to the Internet firewall and provide the private services on an intranet site (or sites) on the protected LAN.

4. Do not rely upon packet filtering alone to protect the network.

5. Do not rely upon Windows ISA Server built-in filtering alone to protect the network.

6. Do not use simple packet filtering or packet-filtering services from the Internet service provider as a replacement for application-layer firewalls. They are not as secure.

7. Don’t rely solely on packet filters for security protection from the Internet. Drop all external routing protocol (EIGRP) updates bound for internal routers. No one outside the network should be transmitting RIP updates to internal routers.

8. Filter out and do not respond to ICMP redirect and echo (ping) messages.

9. Limit the number of external hosts allowed to connect through the firewall to the absolute minimum possible. Take measures to make sure the IP addresses of those hosts are difficult to determine using proxy servers, Firewall or IP masquerades.

10. Make sure there’s no way for a hacker to tell which firewall product is in use.

11. Never publish a list of user or employee names on the Web site. Publish job titles instead.

12. Reduce the number of connections to the Internet to the minimum number possible: one per campus. Many large organizations allow only a single link to the Internet at headquarters and then route all remote offices to that point using the same frame relay lines used to connect internal networks. Respond immediately to intrusion attempts when they are detected. Collect as much information about the attacker as possible. Use their IP domains to determine who the higher-level service providers are.

13. Set up the firewall to discard ICMP echo and to redirect messages to interior hosts.

14. Unbind NetBIOS from all servers outside the firewall. Set the TCP/IP stacks on those machines to accept connection only on ports for services that machine specifically provides.

15. If there is only one connection to the Internet, hard code that connection in the router connected to the service provider’s network. Use RIP, EIGR, OSPF or other automated routing protocols to manage routing inside the network.

16. Do not allow SNMP to travel into or out of the network.

17. Use operating system software on Internet accessible machines that are not susceptible to the Ping of Death.

18. Configure the gateway not to pass Ping packets.

19. Install the latest version of the operating system software.

20. Log network activity and to have the log software signal an alert when a SYN attack or and ICMP flood is in progress. Deny access to the computer or network that originates the attack, and take measures (such as calling or sending an Email message to the administrator of the offending network) to stop the malicious behavior.

21. Un-bind NetBIOS from Internet-accessible network adapters. Allow only authorized hosts outside the network to connect to the DNS servers.

22. Configure the gateway or packet filter to discard all IP packets that use the source routing feature.

23. Disallow services for which there are no proxy servers.

24. Do not allow clear text-password authentication.

25. Do not use RIP or other automated routing protocols. Statically assign the routing tables and disable RIP updates unless the network is too large to manage manually. This makes them impervious to RIP -based denial-of service or spoofing attacks.

26. Don’t allow dial-up connections to the Internet. Remove modems and all other uncontrolled network access devices. Disable free COM ports in the BIOS settings of client computers and password protect the BIOS to prevent users from overriding the security settings.

27. Drop all packets that are TCP source routed. Source routing is rarely used for legitimate purposes.

Log all public access to servers, and check the logs often. Use alerting software to detect hacking attempts against the exposed machines.

28. Set up monitoring software that can alert on flood attacks against the network. Record the IP addresses of the source computers (assuming they look valid) and try to determine the source of the attacks so legal measures can be taken to stop the problem.

29. Set up the own firewall. Place Web and FTP servers outside it and mail servers on the inside. Pass only SMTP and POP3 traffic from external sources. Run no other services or software on mail, Web, FTP, or firewall servers.

30. Use a port scanner periodically (about once a month) from outside the network to check the status of the firewall, packet filter, and NetBIOS bindings. This is especially important when servers are maintained by more than one person or when retaining outsourced security services.

31. Use high-level proxies capable of stripping executable content like ActiveX and Java from Web pages.

32. Use IP masquerades to hide the identity of hosts inside the network.

33. Whenever possible, use proxy servers for all application protocols.

34. Use IP address assignment, in combination with an internal firewall and IP selection on servers, to further control and partition the access allowed to remote users.

35. Use a Web and FTP hosting service rather than computers on the own network to provide the customers with information about the Organization. This puts the Web hosting agency at risk rather than the own network, and allows the provision of no public services from internal servers.

36. As a part of security training, make sure users know to report all instances of denial of service whether they seem important or not. If a specific denial of service can’t be correlate to known downtime or heavy usage, or if a large number of service denials occur in a short time, a siege may be in progress.

37. Great care must be taken when downloading information and files from the internet to safeguard against both malicious code and also inappropriate material.

38. Avoid using one of the smaller Internet service providers. Hackers frequently target them as potential employers because they often have less security awareness and may use UNIX computers, rather than dedicated machines, as gateways and firewalls-making spoof attacks easy to perpetrate. Ask the service provider if they perform background checks on technical service personnel, and reject those that say they do not.

39. Consider using the disconnected Internet security model if the services required by the users can be made available from a single machine.

40. Manually assigning IP addresses if the Organization is a potential espionage target.

41. Apply the anti-spoofing filter.

42. Plans are to be prepared maintained and regularly tested to ensure that damage done by possible external cyber crime attacks can be minimized and that restoration takes place as quickly as possible.

43. In order to reduce the incidence and possibility of internal attacks, access control standards and data classification standards are to be periodically reviewed whilst maintained at all times.

44. Contingency plans for a denial service attack are to be maintained and periodically tested to ensure adequacy

45. Procedures to deal with hoax virus warnings are to be implemented and maintained.

46. Antivirus software is to be deployed across all PCs with regular virus defining updates and scanning across servers, PCs and laptop computers.

47. E-commerce processing systems including the e-commerce Web site(s) are to be designed with protection from malicious attack given the highest priority.

48. E-commerce related Web Site(s) and their associated systems are to be secured using a combination of technology to prevent and detect intrusion together with robust procedures using dual control, where manual interaction is required.

49. Personnel should understand the rights granted to them by the Organization in respect of privacy in personal e-mail transmitted across the Organization systems and networks. Human Resources Department should incorporate a suitable wording into employee contracts to ensure that this privacy issue is fully understood.

50. Confidential and sensitive information should not be transmitted by-mail unless it is secured through encryption or other secure means.

51. E-mail should be considered as an insecure communications medium for the purposes of legal retention for record purposes. With the usage of digital signatures and encryption, reliance upon e-mail may soon be available; however, if in any doubt, treat e-mail as transient.

52. External e-mail messages should have appropriate signature footers and disclaimers appended (E-mail Signature File). A disclaimer is particularly important where, through a miss-key, the email is sent to an inappropriate person. The disclaimer should confirm the confidential nature of the email and request its deletion if the addressee is not, in fact, the intended recipient.

53. Personnel should not open e-mails or attached files without ensuring that the content appears genuine. If you are not expecting to receive the message or are not absolutely certain about its source do not open it.

54. Personnel should be familiar with general e-mail good practice e.g. the need to save, store and file e-mail with business content in a similar manner to the storage of letters and other traditional mail. E -mails of little or no organizational value should on the other hand be regularly purged or deleted from your system.

55. Use standard TEXT (ASCII) messages where possible; these are both smaller (in terms of file size) and are less able to ‘hide’ executable code e.g. HTML based e-mails which can ‘run’ upon opening.

56. The sending of inappropriate messages should be prohibited including those which are sexually harassing or offensive to others on the grounds of race, religion or gender.


Jul 8 2008   8:20AM GMT

Sample I.T. Security Policy - Remote Access Security



Posted by: Yasir Irfan
Networking, Network Security, Security, Servers, Microsoft Windows, Cisco, Policies, Network Documentation Policy, Network Policies, Server Security, Remote Access Secuirty

Finally we are almost proceeding towards the completion of the Sample I.T Security policy, we have just two more topics to cover. Coming days I will try to complete that, here we are with Remote Access Security

 

REMOTE ACCESS SECURITY 

“IS” CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING:

1. RAS server provides the most secure method for remote access to the network if it is reburied.

2. Never allow client computers on the network to answer remote access connections.

3. Organize all remote access servers in a centrally controlled location.

4. Servers have no need to originate dial-out connections (Except when using telephone lines as low cost WAN connections, but these connections should be relatively permanent).

5. To simplify security administration, allow only one method of remote access into the network.

6. Remote access control procedures must provide adequate safeguards through robust identification, authentication and encryption techniques.

7. Carefully consider the wisdom of providing cellular telephones and modems for use with laptop computers. This technology isn’t usually justified considering the relatively modest increase in productivity compared to the cost and the security risk of a lost laptop.

8. Consider using only the NetBEUI protocol for remote access to limit the extent of intrusions on the network.

9. Control the distribution of remote access software on the network. Never allow client computers to run remote control software. If remote control software is necessary, run the software from centrally controlled computers or thin-client servers.

10. Disable dial-in networking, except in the cases of trusted individuals or to special computers,because dial-in networking can bypass regular network security.

11. Encourage an easy-to-use (but secure, of course) method for users to indicate when they need remote access, for how long, and to which phone number. Base the dial-in permissions on these requests. Always verify the request verbally with the user to ensure that it’s not a spoof.

12. Gather contact information for the telephone companies as soon as possible so that it is on hand if dial -up hacking attempts are discovered.

13. If possible, use external modems to answer RAS connections. They can be powered off when no RAS activity is anticipated, and they allow manual disconnection if necessary.

14. If remote access is required only occasionally, set the Remote Access Server service to start manually, then use the services control panel to start the service when needed and stop it when it is no longer in use.

15. Revoke dial-in permissions for users during periods when they are not necessary, and invoke them when the user is away from the office or working from home for a period.

16. Thin client and remote control software can be more secure than remote access software in certain circumstances. For instance, an entire database could be copied down using remote access software, but that same data would be extremely difficult to extract using remote control software configured to disallow file transfers.

17. Tightly control user-based remote access permissions. Allow only those users who have an immediate need to log in remotely.

18. Use alarming software to detect numerous attempts at password guessing over dial-up networks. Use the standard performance monitor to detect this activity, or purchase third party alarming software.

19. Use callback security. Without callback security, tracing RAS based intrusion attempts is very difficult.

20. Use external modems that have on/off switches for those machines that have remote access software installed. Only turn on a modem when a user calls in and requests a remote control connection.

21. Use hard-coded callback security for all remote users that don’t normally travel, to prevent their account from being exploited from unknown locations.

22. Use Microsoft encryption when possible.

23. Use the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol for all Internet connections allowed into the network, or some third-party software that performs the encrypted tunnel function in concert with the firewall.

 

 


Jul 1 2008   7:25AM GMT

Sample I.T Securty Policy - Server Security



Posted by: Yasir Irfan
Networking, Servers, Microsoft Windows, Switches, Routers, Network Documentation Policy, Network Policies, Server Security

Now we are proceeding towards the Server Security Policy, which was quite tiresome to draft.

6‐SERVER SECURITY
“IS” CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING:
1. Limit the number of protocols in use throughout the network to the extent possible.
2. Use connection-monitoring software like the performance monitor to alert the network administrator to potential intrusion attempts.
3. Antivirus software must be chosen from a proven leading supplier
4. Remove the keyboard and monitor from servers if possible. They can be reattached when administration is necessary. Certain mouse devices will not reset properly when reattached; they should be left attached.
5. Add trust relationships between domains only when several users need access.
6. Create groups based on natural associations in the Dept. Assign file permissions by groups. Make user accounts members of the groups that need access to certain files.
7. Don’t allow unrestricted file sharing. Use files sharing with user-based authentication or, at the very least, passwords.
8. Limit the rights of Guest and Anonymous accounts.
9. Never enable the Guest account.
10. Try to arrange data so that as few user accounts as possible are required for users to access it.
11. Do not make Internet Information Server user accounts members of the Users or Domain Users groups. A void making these accounts members of groups that would grant these users additional rights or access permissions.
12. Do not make script virtual directories readable, do not make other virtual directories executable.
13. Create a group for Internet users for lIS; apply permissions to that group account.
14. Do not allow users to place scripts in their own WWW service virtual directories.
15. Use the logging facilities of lIS to watch for a high proportion of unauthorized, forbidden, and not found access attempts.
16. Do not allow NetBIOS connections to be made over the Internet.
17. Replace the default Everyone, Full Control permission with a Domain Users, Change permission on all drives except the system and boot volumes.
18. On each Window 2003 server inside the network, establish filters to pass only those protocols that are explicitly served. This prevents software from working in unexpected ways.
19. To make administration easier and leave less possibility for error, use several shares on one workstation rather than scattering them among several workstations, if possible.
20. Use the No Access permission only then necessary to override other permitted access.
21. Grant permissions for a share to a specific group or set of users, rather than using the everyone group and attempting to restrict users at the subdirectory level.
22. Use NTFS volumes for file sharing whenever possible, and use file-level security rather than share-level security when possible.
23. Keep sensitive information out of the shopper table because that information is accessible to a web browser.
24. Use both a secure port (HTTPS) and Secure Socket Layer encryption, and use strong NTFS permissions restrictions on WWW service virtual directories.
25. Require all possible network connections to services outside the network security to go through a proxy server.
26. Configure the DNS server to exchange information with only computers within the network security and with the DNS server “up” the network tree from them.
27. Remove all instances of the Everyone, Full Control permission. Do not set a default permission to replace it so that all subdirectories from the root do not by default inherit permissions. Add permissions only where specifically required.
28. Access to operating systems is to be restricted to those persons who are authorized to perform systems administration/management functions. Even then such access must be operated under dual control requiring the specific approval of senior management.
29. Staff with access to the $ prompt or command line, could succeed in executing system command,which could damage and corrupt your system and data.
30. Operating System commands could be used to disable or circumvent access control and audit log facilities, etc System access must be monitored regularly to prevent attempts at unauthorized access and to confirm that access control standards are effective.
31. Apply intrusion detection sensor for each server you want to protect.
32. Make sure the audit or accounting functions are turned on.
33. Keep try to find the last patches found for both the Operating systems and applications installed on that servers .That will help for closed O.S and Application holes.
34. Have servers in a physically secure location to prevent unauthorized access.
35. On a regular basis, run programs (for example, Crack, Tiger, COPS and Satan) to check for system weaknesses.
36. Make timely system backups.
37. Keep one copy of backup tapes in a secure facility offsite.
38. Use a virus-checker program.
39. Modify registry in windows severs for maximum security issues according to Microsoft security check list.

Yasir
Personel Website:www.yasirirfan.com

AddThis Social Bookmark Button     0 Comments     RSS Feed     Email a friend