malware

Sep 16 2009   6:41PM GMT

Google search results serve up malware - I’ve had the crime of my life

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, Google, search results, malicious software, drive-by attack, browser security, information security, software security, software

Well, that may not be news to you. However, there is a recent trend in malware propagation that uses Google as the portal to deliver payloads to visitors. Unsuspecting users go to Google and search for topics such as Patrick Swayze’s death or the controversy about Serena Williams cursing at the line judge in her recent US Open tennis match. When a user selects one of the Google search results and visits the page, malware is downloaded to the client computer since the referrer is Google. However, if someone were to just visit the page on their own or through another search engine, the website does not serve up malicious software.

For more information see this Register.com article Swayze death exploited to serve up fake anti-virus - I’ve had the crime of my life. Seems like malware is bombarding us from all directions now. You can’t even trust ads on the NY Times these days.

Thanks for reading & let’s continue to be good network citizens!

Sep 16 2009   6:31PM GMT

Would you click if it showed on the NY Times website? - Really would you?

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, malicious software, ad revenue, computer network, network access, PC, hardware, software, social engineering, licensing, permit, Security, information security, browser security, information security management, user education

Yesterday Fierce CIO reported that New York Times falls victim to rogue ad. This is a trend that seems to be happening more frequently. Rogue malware ads are appearing in a lot of places these days in areas most people would trust as authoritative and reliable sources of information. It is unknown how much the rogue malware “seller” may have gotten by putting the ad on the NY Times website but they likely made something from unsuspecting users. The NY Times did suffer some amount of loss since they disabled all third party ads until the rogue ad was removed. What would you do if an ad popped up on a trusted website saying your computer was infected? Most IT professionals would disregard the message as their systems SHOULD already be protected. However, how much of the general population is not an IT professional (at least outside of their own home )?

What can and should the security industry do to educate users about these social engineering tactics? Should computers be “licensed” or “permitted” to be on the internet to reduce threats to unsuspecting users? That’s a thought for you… what governing body would issue these computer use permits? What would the rate infrastructure be like - based on processor/memory or bandwidth? Where would the permit fees go? Would there be some internet oversight body that uses the fees to have inline malware filters?

Thinking out loud here folks - offer some suggestions. Your input is welcome and appreciated.

Thanks for reading and let’s continue to be good network citizens!

=========================

20090918 Update:

E-Week reports that there is a surge in click fraud. According to the article this is similar to the NY Times advertisement malware threat discussed above. I fear this trend will only get worse. What is a legitimate advertiser or web services organization to do?

Aug 28 2009   4:21PM GMT

BlackHat USA technical presentations available online - not just for hackers

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, bootkit, rootkit, antivirus, threats, vulnerabilities, research, blackhat, hacker, least user authority, least user privilege, Database, Development, information security, infosec, education

The media archives have now been posted on the BlackHat website from the BlackHat technical conference held in July 2009. This is the place to go if you want to see some of the latest information security research and the threats that are REAL and may become real someday. I posted a previous blog entry on the presentation about the Bootkit - rootkit - malware bypasses disk encryption!

Some of the presentation titles:

I Just Found 10 Million SSN’s

Sniff Keystrokes With Lasers/Voltmeters
Side Channel Attacks Using Optical Sampling of Mechanical Energy and Power Line Leakage

Anti-Forensics: The Rootkit Connection

Reversing and Exploiting an Apple® Firmware Update

The Language of Trust: Exploiting Trust Relationships in Active Content

Mo’ Money Mo’ Problems: Making A LOT More Money on the Web the Black Hat Way

The Conficker Mystery

These are just some of the titles available in the BlackHat 2009 Technical Conference media library. Check it out even if you are a web developer or an IT professional who manages desktops or networks or staff members who perform these tasks. You need to know what you are up against and possible methods to fight the threats.

Thanks for reading & lets continue to be good network citizens!

Aug 24 2009   8:33PM GMT

Red alert - automated SHIELDS Up - malware becomes smarter!

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, bot, command and control, malware research, information security, threat, vulnerability

If you haven’t recently kept up to date on the malware front, a recent article at DarkReading may come as a surprise to you. ALERT: Malware has become intelligent!

Rare Malware A Hint Of Threats To Come shows that malware has come a long way and has gained some significant intelligence to avoid detection. The article mentions that some attacks are more directed than broad. These attacks go at specific organizations and even specific data at those organizations. Once the data is collected, the malware can clean up after itself and disappear.

Other “intelligent” behavior seen by researchers includes command and control systems that can determine if a device is actually an owned bot or a researcher imitating a bot. In these types of cases, the command and control system can actually blacklist the researcher’s network range so it cannot intrude on the malware environment.

Quite intriguing stuff and this is what is really happening today! You should be familiar with this stuff if you manage a computer network and are responsible for security. Remember in secURITy - U R IT (you are IT).

Thanks for reading & let’s continue to be good network citizens!

Aug 14 2009   12:48PM GMT

Bootkit - rootkit - malware bypasses disk encryption!

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, bootkit, rootkit, antivirus, threats, vulnerabilities, research, blackhat, hacker, least user authority, least user privilege

If you have not been nervous before about someone infecting computers without your knowledge then you should be much more nervous after reading this article.

In 1987 the Stoned boot sector virus came out and was one of the most prevalent viruses of the early personal computer era. As with most malware concepts, this old threat has been made new again.

An 18-year old security specialist gave a presentation on a bootkit/rootkit (STONED) at the annual Blackhat security conference. This bootkit is not your typical bootkit in that it can bypass disk encryption and load itself into memory before the disk encryption software is activated. The demonstration showed the bootkit loading before disk encryption is activated. Once the malware is loaded from the master boot record (MBR), it is then in memory and can download other malware such as trojans to capture banking credentials.

The bootkit software can be installed either by having physical access to the device or by a user with administrative credentials (this makes a good case for the “least user authority” (LUA) principle). Once the malware is installed and activated it is very difficult to detect. According to one article:

Once installed, Stoned cannot be detected with traditional anti-virus software because no modifications of Windows components take place in memory, says Kleissner. Stoned runs in parallel with the actual Windows kernel. Even an anti-virus function in the BIOS can’t stop the bootkit, as modern Windows versions modify the MBR without referring to the BIOS.

Our challenge as infosec professionals is laid out before us. How we deal with threats like these and protect our users and organizations becomes more difficult all of the time. We have to stay on top of our game because the rules and game conditions are always changing.

Thanks for reading & let’s continue to be good network citizens.

Jun 24 2009   6:24PM GMT

Did you see this? - SYSTEM CLEANING: GETTING RID OF MALWARE FROM INFECTED PCS

Posted by: Troy Tate
malware, malicious software, Security, information security, integrity, availability, trojan, bot, botnet, registry, antivirus, anti-virus, av

I don’t know about you but I do get frustrated when a white paper is advertised and it has little or no meat to it. Most times it seems like the whitepapers offered by vendors today are light marketing fluff with little substance to help IT folks do their job better.

I came across a whitepaper/research document today that will help you do your job better if you manage systems that may become affected by malware. This means anyone that uses a computer could get some use from this document and website.

Check it out today. The whitepaper does not require any registration (another pet peeve of mine - check out bugmenot for Firefox if registrations bug you too!). The whitepaper is titled SYSTEM CLEANING: GETTING
RID OF MALWARE FROM INFECTED PCS.

Thanks for reading and let’s continue to be good network citizens.

Apr 2 2009   8:53PM GMT

5 Things we learned from the Conficker non-event

Posted by: Troy Tate
Conficker, patching, Microsoft, patches, lessons learned, malware, network, predicting future, Security, information security, endpoint protection, endpoint, antivirus, anti-virus

1. The media can take a story about Information Technology and say nothing of substance. What did the 60 Minutes story do for the IT industry? It made Symantec look like they could not effectively address security risks and might even create a sense of false security. I wonder how the CBS IT staff felt when it was revealed that some computers had been compromised. Who was this April Fools joke for? Working in IT at times makes you feel like Rodney Dangerfield - “I don’t get no respect”

Continued »

Feb 11 2009   8:08PM GMT

Tracking down that user/computer that locks AD accounts

Posted by: Troy Tate
Data security, administration, analysis, antivirus, anti-virus, diagnostics, howto, information security, malicious activity, malware, Microsoft, Microsoft Windows, Active Directory, AD, network security, Password, policy enforcement, reporting, risk, risks, scanning, search, Security, security notification, tools, troubleshooting, Windows, password management, account management

With an environment spanning 18+ sites and more than 3000 computers around the globe, you could understand how challenging it would be to track down what device/user might be locking user accounts. There are tools out there that you can pay for that can help do this. However, Microsoft has some free tools that with a little testing and use will permit you to quickly track down where the account is being locked and address the situation.

We had a situation recently where malicious software got onto a couple of machines and attempted to use the Administrator account to login. We have account lockout on our Windows 2003 AD domain, so after the appropriate number of invalid tries the Administrator account was locked out in the domain. This is because the machines were members of the domain and the malware did not distinguish the local administrator account from the domain administrator when attempting to elevate authority. Note that we use least user authority in our environment so the malware was not able to spread beyond these two machines. We suspect the machines became infected due to out of date antivirus signatures.

Unfortunately, the antivirus we use did not alert us to the situation. The way we were alerted was by our Microsoft Systems Center Operations Manager (SCOM) implementation. It notified the SCOM admin that the domain Administrator account was locked. The operations team was then tasked with tracking down what or who was locking this account. This is where the Microsoft Account Lockout and Management Tools came in use and helped isolate the cause. Continued »

Jan 29 2009   9:13PM GMT

Nifty tools for tracking down that “interesting” network traffic

Posted by: Troy Tate
pstools, Sysinternals, Microsoft, Routers, Cisco, troubleshooting, toolkit, Security, WAN, LAN, malware, network analysis, network monitor, network troubleshooting

My previous posting was meant to help you determine the source of potentially dangerous network traffic at your network’s edge. This post is meant to help you identify applications and traffic on your local network that seems to be “interesting”. I define “interesting” as something that you don’t know much about but would find it interesting to learn more about and maybe take some action to shutdown.

As you may already know, I work at an international company with sites around the globe. There are over 2500 computer nodes not including printers, servers, switches, etc. Sometimes it is necessary to identify what traffic is crossing the network links between the sites. There are lots of tools and processes that can be used to gather this information. I will outline a couple here.

Our WAN edge routers are from Cisco. One of the features that can be enabled on a Cisco router is the ip cache flow feature. The show ip cache flow command returns some very useful information. An example is shown below.

show ip cache flow

IP packet size distribution (116972772 total packets):

1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480

.000 .375 .090 .023 .010 .007 .006 .003 .002 .014 .011 .010 .009 .005 .004

512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608

.004 .003 .006 .028 .378 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 278544 bytes

64 active, 4032 inactive, 4367569 added

80215342 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures

Active flows timeout in 30 minutes

Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds

IP Sub Flow Cache, 21640 bytes

0 active, 1024 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow

0 alloc failures, 0 force free

1 chunk, 1 chunk added

last clearing of statistics never

Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)

--------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow

TCP-Telnet         724      0.0         7   430      0.0       6.1      15.4

TCP-FTP          13859      0.0         9    93      0.0       6.7       3.4

TCP-WWW        3537205      0.8        14  1021     12.2       3.7       9.7

TCP-SMTP           290      0.0       104   989      0.0       5.5       1.8

TCP-X                3      0.0         2    42      0.0       0.3       1.3

TCP-BGP             18      0.0         1    43      0.0       0.0      13.9

TCP-Frag           112      0.0        37    78      0.0      18.3      15.5

TCP-other       684674      0.1        12   831      2.0       6.4       7.0

UDP-DNS           1973      0.0         1    72      0.0       0.1      15.4

UDP-NTP            248      0.0         1    77      0.0       0.0      15.4

UDP-Frag             3      0.0         1    45      0.0       0.0      15.6

UDP-other        10247      0.0         1   210      0.0       0.8      15.4

ICMP             97640      0.0        19    83      0.4      18.6      15.4

GRE              20509      0.0      2598   150     12.4     165.6      14.5

Total:         4367505      1.0        26   593     27.2       5.2       9.4

SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts

Tu0           10.aa.20.254    Fa0/0         10.bb.21.1      01 0000 0000    20

Tu0           10.cc.12.200    Fa0/0         10.bb.21.1      01 0000 0000    20

Tu0           10.dd.12.8      Fa0/0         10.bb.12.150    06 0D0A 0871   467

Tu0           10.ee.12.200    Fa0/0         10.bb.ee.140    06 0A23 01BD     1

Tu0           10.ff.12.150    Fa0/0         10.bb.ee.130    06 048A 07DA     1

Tu0           10.gg.20.254    Fa0/0         10.bb.21.1      01 0000 0000    20

Tu0           10.hh.20.254    Fa0/0         10.bb.21.1      01 0000 0000    20

Tu0           10.ff.12.150    Fa0/0         10.bb.ee.11     06 048A 04A7     1

Tu0           10.oo.12.210    Fa0/0         10.bb.12.200    11 0035 EA0B     1

Tu1           203.151.20.17   Fa0/0         10.bb.50.200    06 0050 055D     5

Tu1           203.151.20.17   Fa0/0         10.bb.50.200    06 0050 055E    10

As you can see it includes statistics about the packet size distribution, the various protocols and amount of traffic for each protocol and then a summary listing of the traffic through the various interfaces on the router. In this case, the traffic is passing through a couple of encrypted tunnel interfaces. This is where things get interesting when troubleshooting traffic on a link. The first column is the source interface, then the source IP address. The third column is the destination interface followed by the destination IP address. The next 3 columns give some critical information about the traffic between the source and destination hosts. These values are all given in HEX. There is the protocol number (e.g. 01 - ICMP, 06 - TCP, 11 - UDP). See the protocol listing at IANA for more information on these numbers - remember to convert from HEX to decimal.

The next two columns are the source port and destination port pairing. These values are also in HEX. So, converting values like 01BD to 445 indicates that the traffic is Microsoft DS according to the port number listing at IANA. Port 0035 (53 decimal) would be DNS traffic. Port 0050 (80 decimal) would be http traffic. Port 01BB (443 decimal) would be https. So, as you can see, lots of information is right there on the router and no sniffing is required to see what traffic is on your network.

Once you find an “interesting” source and destination pair that concerns you, you might consider finding out what application is generating the traffic between that source / destination pair. This can be done unobtrusively using some of the excellent tools from the Microsoft/Sysinternals toolkit. For example, the following command will list the current tcp & udp connections on a remote computer (10.xx.50.81) - note that you must have administrative access to the remote computer to run this command (netstat is not a Sysinternals tool but is built into the Windows operating system):

psexec \\10.xx.50.81 netstat -ano

The output would look something like this:

PsExec v1.94 - Execute processes remotely

Copyright (C) 2001-2008 Mark Russinovich

Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Active Connections

Proto Local Address Foreign Address State PID

TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 852

TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4

TCP 0.0.0.0:5800 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1748

TCP 0.0.0.0:5900 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1748

TCP 0.0.0.0:8085 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1456

TCP 10.xx.50.81:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4

TCP 10.xx.50.81:445 10.bb.50.64:1826 ESTABLISHED 4

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1221 10.xx.12.200:135 ESTABLISHED 608

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1222 10.xx.12.200:1026 ESTABLISHED 608

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1822 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1823 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1827 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1828 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1829 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1830 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 10.xx.50.81:1831 10.xx.50.241:8080 ESTABLISHED 3756

TCP 127.0.0.1:1068 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2412

UDP 0.0.0.0:445 *:* 4

UDP 0.0.0.0:500 *:* 608

netstat exited on 10.xx.50.81 with error code 0.

So, these results show that the host has various tcp & udp connections that are in an established state. It shows the source & destination ports (again like the show ip cache flow results). The other very useful piece of information that is shown is the PID or process identifier. This number matches a process running on the remote computer. So, to find out what the various running processes are and their PID’s, run the following command:

pslist \\10.xx.50.81

The results returned are like the following:

pslist v1.28 - Sysinternals PsList

Copyright ¬ 2000-2004 Mark Russinovich

Sysinternals

Process information for 10.xx.50.81:

Name Pid Pri Thd Hnd Priv CPU Time Elapsed Time

Idle 0 0 1 0 0 0:37:20.984 0:00:00.000

System 4 8 67 316 0 0:00:48.343 0:00:00.000

smss 464 11 3 21 164 0:00:00.015 4:43:15.698

csrss 528 13 15 545 2520 0:00:13.484 4:43:14.792

winlogon 552 13 19 524 9488 0:00:04.265 4:43:14.370

services 596 9 16 295 1876 0:00:04.281 4:43:14.183

lsass 608 9 20 428 4160 0:00:02.843 4:43:14.167

svchost 792 8 17 193 3284 0:00:00.796 4:43:13.667

svchost 852 8 10 371 2144 0:00:35.421 4:43:13.370

svchost 916 8 70 2092 16500 0:00:54.359 4:43:13.292

svchost 968 8 6 84 1596 0:00:00.921 4:43:13.245

svchost 992 8 15 292 3044 0:00:00.843 4:43:12.714

spoolsv 1196 8 12 142 3492 0:00:00.296 4:43:12.277

stormliv 1324 8 9 163 4952 0:00:08.343 4:43:04.339

EngineServer 1444 8 3 35 576 0:00:00.078 4:43:03.995

FrameworkService 1456 8 21 356 20632 0:00:37.203 4:43:03.573

VsTskMgr 1504 8 19 243 7128 0:00:29.578 4:43:02.714

MDM 1556 8 4 86 1092 0:00:00.140 4:43:02.495

mfevtps 1580 8 6 126 6848 0:00:02.609 4:43:02.370

ArchivingORBService 1636 8 4 88 3304 0:00:15.031 4:43:01.964

svchost 1696 8 5 118 2608 0:00:00.453 4:43:01.777

CcmExec 1836 8 13 810 14688 0:00:12.796 4:43:01.214

Mcshield 1880 13 26 182 45316 0:02:15.078 4:42:59.464

naPrdMgr 1964 8 6 130 208448 0:01:05.328 4:42:57.902

mfeann 1968 8 8 151 2264 0:00:01.625 4:42:57.855

alg 2412 8 5 102 1256 0:00:00.109 4:42:17.303

wmiprvse 2876 8 4 140 4132 0:00:00.781 4:42:09.979

wmiprvse 2660 8 7 146 1996 0:00:00.828 4:39:42.549

explorer 3676 8 12 442 17392 0:01:01.828 3:59:34.124

hkcmd 4092 8 2 86 896 0:00:00.140 3:59:30.406

igfxpers 816 8 3 93 868 0:00:00.078 3:59:30.343

UdaterUI 3388 8 5 115 1648 0:00:00.859 3:59:27.390

shstat 3252 8 10 98 2160 0:00:00.812 3:59:27.093

ctfmon 3968 8 1 67 984 0:00:00.156 3:59:25.828

Then if we need to remotely stop a running process that we consider suspicious or “interesting” issue the following command:

pskill 3968 \\10.xx.50.81 - note you can use either the PID # or the name of the process - however, you should use the PID if there are multiple instances of the application running

The results of the command, if successful, should look like:

PsKill v1.12 - Terminates processes on local or remote systems

Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Mark Russinovich

Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Process 3968 on 10.xx.50.81 killed….

This process has become very useful when finding some rogue processes (malware) on some remote computers and there is no other way to disable the system or application. You can also issue a psshutdown command in a similar fashion, but the user may attempt to restart the machine again and then you will have to again shutdown the rogue application. There’s lots of ways to handle this situation including shutting down the LAN switch port if you have that access and privilege.

Let me know what processes you go through when managing remote systems where you may have limited physical access. Good luck out there and let’s be good network citizens!

Jan 26 2009   7:14PM GMT

Do you manage a firewall and want to find the source of malicious network activity? - Check out the Internet Malicious Activity Map

Posted by: Troy Tate
Firewalls, internet, WWW, Subnet, malicious activity, malware, research, network, graph, activity, Security, network security

For those of you who manage your own network, you have to consider the strength of the firewall at your network perimiter, the knowledge and skills of those who manage it. You also have to provide technology that can help protect your mobile users. Part of building that secure environment is understanding the environment out there in the wild world web.This is just one of the resources available out there. Please leave feedback if you are aware of others that might be useful to readers.

I recently came across an interesting graph that shows where some of the malicious traffic originates from on the internet. It is called the Internet malicious activity map (PNG) The graph is from Team Cymru. The graph displays in “heatmap” style in a Hilbert Curve (check this out if you are a fan of fractals). This is an interesting way to graph a lot of data in a small space. As is true in heatmaps, the colors indicate the concentration of malicious activity. The lighter the color, the higher the malicious activity. Take a look at the 85.x.x.x/8, 87.x.x.x/8, and 88.x.x.x/8 sections of the graph. Looks like these networks are major sources of malicious activity on the internet. I would recommend reviewing this graph and determining if the address ranges showing high malicious activities are part of your organization’s network. If so, then be very concerned. If not, then does your network receive any traffic originating on these subnets? Maybe you should consider blocking traffic from these source subnets. See the Team Cymru Malevolence Monitoring website for more security oriented information.

Thanks for reading and let’s be good network citizens!