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	<title>Comments on: Many still holding off on Oracle database CPUs</title>
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		<title>By: Bfedorko</title>
		<link>http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/eye-on-oracle/many-still-holding-off-on-oracle-database-cpus/#comment-1386</link>
		<dc:creator>Bfedorko</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2009 18:38:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/eye-on-oracle/?p=616#comment-1386</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Database security is an all-too-often neglected facet of Database administration.  We DBAs often feel a false sense of security, having the data stores locked behind a firewall, or somewhere on an internal network.  However, the more I read about organizations neglecting to take even the most basic steps at shoring up their data store&#039;s security posture, the more odd, out-of-step excuses I seem to run into:

 - &quot;We&#039;re on our own server, behind a firewall - No one can get in&quot;
Oddly, this article mentions the Forrester Research report detailing &quot;database attacks are at an all-time high&quot;.

- &quot;We can&#039;t afford the downtime&quot; 
But you can&#039;t afford a DR failover site?  That would also allow you to roll out the CPUs without downtime.

- &quot;We can&#039;t risk introducing a bug&quot;
You don&#039;t have a testbed?  Of any sort?  How do you test your Recovery?  Nothing in your architecture ever changes?  Really?

- &quot;We do not have any specific requirements for the application of vendor supplied security patches&quot;
So unless you are mandated by an outside agency or organization to protect your data, you simply refuse to?

  I also do not buy the &#039;Risk Analysis&#039; excuse.  Although some CPUs admittedly don&#039;t patch critical security holes, about 50% do.  What type of mitigation is needed during Risk Analysis to not patch security holes that allow privileged user access without credentials?  It would have to be incredibly compelling.

As a DBA, I have never been in an organization that did not value efforts to harden their data stores, so I am going to place this responsibility on our doorstep.  As a DBA, you are the subject matter expert for the DBMS - If security is lacking in this area, we should step up or be prepared to be accountable for the results.

Brian Fedorko]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Database security is an all-too-often neglected facet of Database administration.  We DBAs often feel a false sense of security, having the data stores locked behind a firewall, or somewhere on an internal network.  However, the more I read about organizations neglecting to take even the most basic steps at shoring up their data store&#8217;s security posture, the more odd, out-of-step excuses I seem to run into:</p>
<p> &#8211; &#8220;We&#8217;re on our own server, behind a firewall &#8211; No one can get in&#8221;<br />
Oddly, this article mentions the Forrester Research report detailing &#8220;database attacks are at an all-time high&#8221;.</p>
<p>- &#8220;We can&#8217;t afford the downtime&#8221;<br />
But you can&#8217;t afford a DR failover site?  That would also allow you to roll out the CPUs without downtime.</p>
<p>- &#8220;We can&#8217;t risk introducing a bug&#8221;<br />
You don&#8217;t have a testbed?  Of any sort?  How do you test your Recovery?  Nothing in your architecture ever changes?  Really?</p>
<p>- &#8220;We do not have any specific requirements for the application of vendor supplied security patches&#8221;<br />
So unless you are mandated by an outside agency or organization to protect your data, you simply refuse to?</p>
<p>  I also do not buy the &#8216;Risk Analysis&#8217; excuse.  Although some CPUs admittedly don&#8217;t patch critical security holes, about 50% do.  What type of mitigation is needed during Risk Analysis to not patch security holes that allow privileged user access without credentials?  It would have to be incredibly compelling.</p>
<p>As a DBA, I have never been in an organization that did not value efforts to harden their data stores, so I am going to place this responsibility on our doorstep.  As a DBA, you are the subject matter expert for the DBMS &#8211; If security is lacking in this area, we should step up or be prepared to be accountable for the results.</p>
<p>Brian Fedorko</p>
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