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Automatic Theft Machines

Sep 22 2009   4:33PM GMT

Next Generation ATM Skimmers



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Automatic Theft Machines, ATM Security, Data Breaches, Hardware & InfoSec, information security

I was over on identitytheft.info watching some video feeds when I came across this one. It’s worth taking a look at not because the technique for attaching Bad Things is all that different, but because of the hardware the Bad Thing is using.

Check out the hardware used: a modified cell phone (to call home with numbers? how convenient!) a camera and an SD card. It’s the hack of the cell phone I find the most interesting. Of course, they didn’t give us any details on that, but I would be interested to know how it was modified, wouldn’t you?

Although identitytheft.info is rather self-serving in its presentation (providing a variety of services to “victims”) they often have newsfeed videos that are very well done.

For instance, there’s another video that shows a keypad that can capture the pin (instead of a camera) as you type it in glued over the regular keypad.

They recommend notifying the bank if you discover a skimmer; I recommend notifying the police. They’ll take care of notifying the bank(s).

Sep 17 2009   9:07PM GMT

Pumping Gas and Losing Your Shirt



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
ATM Security, Automatic Theft Machines, information security, Hardware & InfoSec

I hadn’t really thought about it, but it made perfect sense the first time I read about it: thieves are capturing credit card and debit card data at the gas pump.

Given that the pump is acting as a big cash register, it makes perfect sense that skimmers could be attached the same way they are attached to an ATM.

Thieves open the pump using a skeleton key and install skimming devices to cables leading to the card reader and PIN pad that pulls data from a card’s magnetic stripe and records the cardholder’s PIN. If the PIN pad encrypts the PIN at the pump, they can attach a miniature camera to record PINS as cardholders enter them.

And this is what is significant: you can’t see the skimmer on the pump because it is inside the pump. There’s no way to know if you’re paying for gas and a little fraud, too.

The skimmers steal credit card numbers, but thieves prefer debit cards because they mean quick cash at automated teller machines. They use the information to make fake cards and hit ATMs – some across the country from the originating theft – for $200 to $800 a pop.

The money is often gone before the debit card holder knows it, and it can take time to correct the problem. One recommendation is to use the Credit rather than Debit feature when filling your tank. Debits allow immediate access to cash and don’t require a signature, two other reasons they are more attractive to criminals.

Skimming has been ramping up starting last year due to the bad economy; thieves need to access cash rather than goods they can resell elsewhere.

Thieves can leave these skimmers attached to pumps for months before removing them—and collecting data from thousands of credit cards. Then, the thieves either sell the credit card information on the internet or they make fraudulent duplicate cards with victim’s account numbers and expiration dates.

In one case, thieves left the same skimmer attached to a single gas pump in Washington for eleven months. (Did no one see this thing???) Then they came back, retrieved the device and drained hundreds of bank accounts in a single weekend.

In May 2008, an investigation was opened into a case in San Jose California in which thieves stole more than $200,000 from 180 victims. Authorities estimate that between $1 million and $3.5 million has been stolen from victims of gas pump identity theft in five states over recent months.

Best advice: If you do want to use a credit or debit card at the gas station, go inside and make the purchase there. Inconvenient, but so is losing all the money in your checking account, or having to close your credit card account.


Jun 19 2009   2:05PM GMT

ATMs that just spit out money - Nice!



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Automatic Theft Machines, Data Breaches, ATM Security

As you may know, one of my favorite posting topics has to do with ATMs. I call them Automatic Theft Machines because there are way too many stories of equipment being hacked, and/or swiping hardware being installed, or people just driving away with them.

Well, along comes a story about the progression of this issue: In Eastern Europe, the bad guys have perfected the art of getting the machine to spit out all its money on demand.

According to the article (linked above), authorities say there must be some sort of inside access to allow software to be installed. The articles claims that after unlocking the security, the inside equipment is quite vulnerable.

Hmmm, hard on the outside, yummy and soft on the inside….where have we heard that before? And something else interesting to note: many of the ATMs appear to be Diebolds; the same company that makes voting machines for us……and was implicated in another attack earlier this year, also in Eastern Europe.

The ATMs utilize a scaled down version of Windows XP, which actually doesn’t make me feel any better at all.


Apr 15 2009   7:01PM GMT

The Beginning of the End for PIN Codes



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Automatic Theft Machines, Data Breaches, PCI DSS, Security Devices

Yesterday Wired released a story that reveals a startling detail about the TJMaxx data breach: hackers were able to cash in on stolen debit cards because they had a way to crack PINS.

This “minor detail” was buried in an affadavit last year, but Wired has put it together with some other information afloat on the NET, and the article is a really good read on what happens to your PIN from your debit card as it transits various networks to receive approval. Your PIN gets decrypted and re-encrypted by a Hardware Security Module (HSM) each time it transits a network. Lots of opportunities for capture with the help of an insider or some sniffing malware.

“While statistically not a large percentage…in 2008, attacks against PIN information represent individual data-theft cases having the largest aggregate exposure in terms of unique records,” says the report. “In other words, PIN-based attacks and many of the very large compromises from the past year go hand in hand.”

Although there are ways to mitigate the attacks, experts say the problem can only really be resolved if the financial industry overhauls the entire payment processing system.

Ouch.

Clearly, PIN-based authentication has been cracked, and will be cracked more and more. Leave your debit card at home and Pay Cash Instead.


Mar 9 2009   11:59PM GMT

ATM Heists Grow in 2007 and 2008



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Automatic Theft Machines, Data Breaches, PCI DSS

A story on Wired came out recently about a $9 million ripoff of RBS WorldPay. Further reading on Wired led me to articles about, variously, a cracking of an ATM network in 7-Eleven stores that linked to Citibank, iWire cash payment cards, and Direct Cash management cards.

It seems that the bad folks are cracking ATMs and cash/debit/gift cards MUCH faster than the banks and financial services people can keep up. They have gotten adept at being able to clone cards, crack PINS and break account limits in order to drain accounts quickly with a host of people making fast runs on the system. Profits range from $750,000 to, so far, $9 million.

Banks and businesses are being ever more cagey about announcing such breaches, pointing fingers at various processors and claiming they can’t talk due to “ongoing criminal investigations.” This is the claim for the heist of $9 million that happened last November. Frankly, that excuse is getting harder and harder to swallow.

As my last post noted, we are starting to see a pattern of “repeat-offenders.” Companies that are broken into more than once, and don’t seem to be able (or willing) to make changes so that breakins stop happening. Monster.com comes to mind.

Of course, as consumers, we don’t see an impact until our cards get canceled, or God forbid, our accounts get drained. But for people being issued cash cards as a form of payroll, this can have devastating consequences. If you’re living from paycard to paycard, and one paycard gets hacked, what will you do for food, gas other necessary things that week? It might take the card company a week or two to straighten things out - maybe more. What happens until then?

The rising cost of these data losses are being well documented. For now, banks and financial companies are eating the cost out of their profits, and collecting damages from each other. It’s not a pretty picture, and ATMs are a growing part of the mess.

This is liable to get worse before it gets better. Companies tend to be unwilling to spend money on securing data in the best of times; but in these worst of times, securing data is just not happening.

PCI - Pay Cash Instead.


Feb 20 2009   3:06PM GMT

Must READ: A Great Article on ATM Card Skimming



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Automatic Theft Machines, credit card crime, Data Breaches

If you want to know what to look for in the growing cybercrime market of ATM card skimming, read the article and check out the pictures.

Knowing what to look for is half the battle. And kudos to the author, James Heary, a Cisco Security Expert. He’s just gotten added to my Blog Roll!


Dec 11 2008   5:27PM GMT

More on ATMs - The Daily Store Owner Log



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Identity theft, DataManagement, Security Devices, Hardware & InfoSec, Stupid Technology, Automatic Theft Machines

Did you know that a store that puts in an ATM for customer use also provides a daily log of transactions to the owner? The log includes the Bank name, last four numbers of the account, the customer name, and the transaction.

So if I do an account balance request, that comes up in the log. The amount in my account comes up in the log.

The log includes all transactions done on that machine, so everyone’s name, Bank name, how much they have, how much they took out, etc, is all there on the log.

I was chatting with an acquaintance who owns a store in Maine, and she pretty much knows everyone who comes in her store. When she had an ATM put in, after numerous customer requests, she began getting those daily reports (probably because she gets a percentage of transactions). She was embarrassed at how much information she could see about people she knows. I would be, too.

Where does this report get stored? Who has access to the reports? The manager? The clerks?

Here’s an acronym I really like: TMI (TOO MUCH INFORMATION)

Why does a store owner need that much information? I’ll try and find out.


Oct 21 2008   1:58PM GMT

ATMs with Bugs - At the Grocery Store



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Wireless, Security, Data Breaches, Hardware & InfoSec, Automatic Theft Machines

From the Wall Street Journal comes the disturbing news that a high-tech wireless “bug” has been found in hundreds of grocery store ATMs in five different European countries. According to WSJ:

Examining the store’s credit-card readers, investigators discovered a high-tech bug tucked behind the motherboard. It was small card containing wireless communication technology.

The bug reads an individual’s card number and the corresponding personal identification number, then packages and stores the data. The device would once a day call a number in Lahore to upload the data to servers there and obtain instructions on what to steal next.

The easiest way police have been finding these things is to weigh the ATM, although the bug (a card, actually, and I think has to be plugged into the motherboard) only weighs about 4 ounces. How many more will they find? Now that ATM fraudsters can go “upscale” to a wireless bug instead of a clumsy card skimmer, theft becomes even easier. These bugs are big enough to be programmable, so that they could only collect information from Platinum level cards, for instance, instead of my Uncle Bert’s VISA card.

Although the article does not address debit cards, I would have to wonder what the impact was on those? Did they escape due to the lack of PIN capture? Possibly.

The first solution I would think of would be to lock down the phone line so that it ONLY can dial home (and not to Lahore to deliver its’ payload). Not only that, log and report any attempts to dial elsewhere.

This is a VERY sophisticated attack, and appears to be widespread. Early estimates indicate a theft between 50 to 100 million dollars.

Just who has had access to the inside of those machines, that were built in China? How are they secured? The report mentions that the bug is “attached behind to the motherboard.” Somebody has some inside knowledge of this equipment and has used that knowledge to quite an effect.

Thieves keep getting smarter.


Oct 10 2008   2:12PM GMT

ATMs Redux - Why I Don’t Use My Debit Card



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Security, Data Breaches, PCI DSS, Hardware & InfoSec, Automatic Theft Machines

In a previous post about Automatic Theft Machines I commented on the worrisome rise in skimming with these machines.

Now, to add to our pain, we should be concerned about gas station pumps, according to NBC. Take a look at the picture of the device - makes me wonder how they set it up without inside help.

The article goes on to discuss the rising crime rate from debit card theft. Once these folks pluck your card number and PIN, they can clean out your bank account in no time flat. Unlike credit card fraud, where the bank removes your liability after $50, people are reporting a struggle to get their bank accounts credited after all the cash has been extracted.

So, let’s see, ATMs, airline check-in machines, and now gas pumps.

I’d decided after the Hannaford breach that we would no longer use our debit card unless standing inside the bank. And even that is not risk free from skimming.


Aug 5 2008   4:46PM GMT

ATMs - Automated Theft Machines



Posted by: Arian Eigen Heald
Security, Identity theft, Security Devices, Hardware & InfoSec, Eigen's Rules of Thumb, Automatic Theft Machines

It’s absolutely fascinating (in a nerve-wracking sort of way) to read about how many different ways there are to use ATMs to capture (and steal) accounts and PIN numbers. From there, it takes very little time to create a fraudulent card and spend what you can before the bank catches up. It’s a triumph of hardware over software. Thieves simply work around the software controls to capture the information they want.

For example, the concept of “skimming.” Typically, thieves attach a device to the outside of the ATM that records the magnetic stripe information as you insert it. They also need a camera of some sort to capture the PIN as you type it in. For a classic example, with pictures you can see that the card skimmer fits in front of the regular card slot. For PINs, the clever placement of a pinhole wireless camera makes it all way too easy.

Thieves tend to get endlessly creative: One fellow bought his own ATM equipment and kept moving it around from place to place in order to capture information. He was good enough at it to collect at least $4 million, and is still at large.

More losses come from retail ATMs (those found in supermarkets, convenience stores, gas stations, or other non-banking environments) where there are less stringent controls and only casual observers. In May of this year, the ATM at one gas station was rigged, with at least 80 victims. When he was finally apprended, he had stolen more than $185,000. Ouch.

There are about 360,000 ATMs in the United States, according to Bankrate.com Only half of them are at a bank.

The ATM designers are moving to internal card readers and other techniques to eliminate external skimming devices, but when you can buy your own ATM and move it around, controls on sales of such machines must be tightened.

Rule of Thumb: If I don’t go to the bank for gas, I won’t go to the gas station for money.